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The International Legacy of Brown v. Board of Education
Justice Richard J. Goldstone* and Brian Ray**
I. INTRODUCTION
Our initial approach to this paper was to research and consider the extent to
which foreign courts have considered the decision in Brown v. Board of
Education' to be relevant to cases coming before them. We were aware that anti-
apartheid activists considered it and Brown 112 as models of civil rights litigation
and that on a few occasions Brown had been cited by the South African
Constitutional Court as persuasive authority. It soon became apparent, however,
that the subsequent reputation and use of Brown in that context was only part of
the story: the international legacy of the decision can only be fully appreciated
and understood in light of the international context in which it was decided.
Brown was part of an international movement towards the development of
international human rights. It was relevant to the increased reliance on the rule of
law and the use of legal process in enforcing the norms that emerged from the
sordid history of Nazi war crimes.
Much has been written about Brown, and the international political situation
in which Brown was decided has been presented in detail elsewhere.' What is
lacking in this impressive literature is a complete presentation of the international
story in which Brown plays a very significant role. This article attempts to fill
that gap by connecting Brown's role as an example of the ability of courts to
promote human rights and lawyers to effect social change to the specific
historical circumstances-in particular the emerging international human rights
movement-that influenced the arguments in this seminal case.
We shall attempt to describe the international legacy of Brown in two
discrete but related parts. First, we survey the international and domestic political
contexts of the decision, which other commentators have convincingly
demonstrated played a prominent role in the debates surrounding legalized
segregation and in the arguments before the Supreme Court in the case itself.
Important in this section is the intense and widespread international attention that
was paid both to the problem of race relations in the U.S. and the decision in
Brown. This background sets up the conclusions we draw from our survey of
international use of Brown in the second section: notwithstanding the relatively
* Retired Justice of the South African Constitutional Court and former Chief Prosecutor of the United
Nations Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
** Associate at Jones Day in Cleveland, Ohio and former foreign law clerk to Justice Richard Goldstone
during the 2003 term. The views set forth herein are the personal views of the author and do not necessarily
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few actual citations to Brown, its importance as an example of social change
through the legal process-and in the face of apparent majority opposition-has
enabled Brown and the United States model of democracy generally to play a
significant role in the development of human rights throughout the world.
II. INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL CONTEXT
The experience of World War II and, in particular, the horrors of the
Holocaust produced an international environment in the post-war period that was
ripe for the development of international human rights norms and an effective
means of enforcing them. Indeed, blame for the war itself was attributed
specifically to the lack of such norms:
The great and terrible war which has now ended.., was a war made
possible by the denial of democratic principles of the dignity, equality,
and mutual respect for men, and by the propagation, in their place,
through ignorance and prejudice, of the doctrine of the inequality of men
4
and races.
The struggle to develop such norms and specifically the battle to develop
international policies that condemned racism had begun in the aftermath of
World War I but gained increased attention and a renewed sense of urgency
because the inhumanity of the Holocaust brought racism to the forefront of
international concern.'
The United Nations was developed in the aftermath of World War II and was
explicitly concerned with responding to the human rights abuses of the Holocaust.
As a result, the United Nations' human rights regime was created largely in
response to the perceived problems of racism.
There was a conflict between the desire to respond to the result of racist
Holocaust policies and the political concerns of the United States, United
Kingdom and Australia that such response would invite scrutiny of legal
segregation policies in the United States and Australia and racist policies in the
United Kingdom colonies.' Concerns about race played a major role in U.S.
policy towards the development of international human rights instruments.
Notwithstanding its concerns about the domestic effect of such instruments,
however, U.S. policy-makers recognized as early as 1942 that a commitment to
4. Paul Gordon Lauren, First Principles of Racial Equality: History and the Politics and Diplomacy of
Human Rights Provisions in the United Nations' Charter, 5 HUM. RTS. Q. 1 (1983) (quoting UNESCO,
Conference for the Establishment of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization,
ECO/CONF./29, Nov. 16, 1945, 93).
5. See Kevin Boyle & Anneliese Baldaccini, A Critical Evaluation of International Human Rights
Approaches to Racism, in DISCRIMINATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE CASE OF RACISM 135, 141 (Sandra
Fredman ed., 2001) (stating "it was largely the search for an effective international response to racism that
produced the main components of the UN human rights regime").
6. Id.
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human rights at the international level was necessary to the maintenance of
international peace and that prohibiting discrimination was an essential aspect of
such a commitment.7 A committee in the U.S. Department of State in 1943
produced draft articles for the U.N. which included a prohibition on
discrimination on the basis of race, nationality, language, political opinion, or
religious belief. The internal analysis of the suggested provision expressly tied
the need for it to the racist Nuremberg laws:
[the] ban on discrimination [is] fundamental because without it no person's
rights are assured and those of all may be undermined.... The prohibition
of discrimination on the grounds of race is intended to prevent the
enactment of laws like the notorious Nuremberg laws, and similar laws in
other countries, discriminating against "non-Aryans. '
Tellingly, however, the committee was also careful to state that the provision
would not interfere with segregation laws because of "the most notable omission":
"the absence of guarantees or measures of enforcement...."9
W.E.B. Du Bois, commenting on the negotiation process of the U.N. Charter,
exhorted the participants to focus on the need to address racism as one of the
central causes of war.'° Several consultants to the American delegation similarly
argued that human rights-including provisions on racial equality-should play a
more significant role in the Charter."
The final draft of the U.N. Charter contained strong language condemning
racism and calling for equality. Article 1 listed as a major purpose the
achievement of human rights and fundamental freedoms "for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language or religion," and several other provisions,
including articles 13 and 55, contained similar language. The inclusion of this
language was, however, a very modest victory for the advocates of human rights
because of the protection of state sovereignty enshrined in article 2(7): "Nothing
contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall
require the Members to submit such matters to settlement....""
The vision of the original U.S. drafters was thus achieved: the inclusion of
language creating an international commitment against discrimination that was
unable to have direct impact on the existing domestic situation. The compromise
achieved in the Charter did not end the debate over discrimination either
internationally or domestically. The establishment of the U.N. was followed by
7. Lauren, supra note 4, at 7.
8. Id. at9.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 15.
11. Id. at 16.
12. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3.
13. Id. art. 2, para. 7.
2004 / The International Legacy of Brown v. Board of Education
an intense debate about race and equality which resulted in the development of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in 1948. And, as we
discuss below, domestic civil rights activists in the U.S. attempted to creatively
use these new international agreements in their fight against segregation.
III. DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONTEXT
The domestic political context in which Brown was decided was intimately
connected to these international events due to a growing awareness within
domestic civil rights organizations of the potential that the development of
international human rights norms presented for domestic litigation. There was
also increasing pressure from interest groups such as the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) for the U.S. government to live
up to its international reputation as a leader of democratic values.
Derrick Bell's "interest convergence" theory 4 highlights the domestic
significance of the prevailing international situation for the Brown decision. Bell
correctly points out that by eliminating legalized segregation the decision
provided immediate credibility to the U.S. government's message of freedom and
democracy to developing countries in its battle against the spread of
Communism." As Bell noted in an earlier article, this aspect of the case was
highlighted by the attorneys of the NAACP and the federal government in their
briefs to the Supreme Court in Brown:
6
It is in the context of the present world struggle between freedom and
tyranny that the problem of racial discrimination must be viewed... [for]
discrimination against minority groups in the United States has an adverse
effect upon our relations with other countries. Racial discrimination
furnishes grist for the Communist propaganda mills, and it raises doubts
even among friendly nations as to the intensity of our devotion to the
democratic faith.1
7
14. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 518, 522 (1980). Bell hypothesizes that the result in Brown was the result of the convergence for a limited
time of dominant white and minority black interests in eliminating legalized racial segregation. Id. at 522-25. One
of the factors he identifies as creating this convergence is the perceived need to improve the international reputation
of the U.S. among developing countries in order to prevent the spread of Communism. Id. at 524; see also Bell,
supra note 3 (describing in detail the arguments presented to the U.S. Supreme Court in Brown concerning the
threat of Communism and the predictions of international reaction to Brown in contemporary press publications).
Bell goes on to conclude that the subsequent lack of significant progress in desegregating public schools in the
United States can be explained by a growing divergence of those same interests. Bell, supra, at 526-28.
15. Bell, supra note 14, at 524.
16. See Bell, supra note 3, at 12.
17. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (quoted
in Bell, supra note 3, at 12 n.30).
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And contemporary media accounts equally recognized the international significance
of the decision." The level of media awareness of the international importance of
Brown is succinctly described in another account of the Brown decision:
After summing up the effect of the decision on the children in the
segregation states, Time, in typical Time style, observed: "The
international effect may be scarcely less important. In many countries,
where U.S. prestige and leadership have been damaged by the fact of
U.S. segregation, it will come as a timely reassertion of the basic
American principle that 'all men are created equal."' Time's companion
publication, Life, supported this position with the assertion that the
Supreme Court "at one stroke immeasurably raised the respect of other
nations for the U.S." From Newsweek came these words: "the
psychological effect will be tremendous ... segregation in the public
schools has become a symbol of inequality, not only to Negroes in the
United States but to colored peoples elsewhere in the world. It has also
been a weapon of world Communism. Now that symbol lies shattered."
More pointed is the statement from Citizen's Guide to De-Segregation:
"The Voice of America carried the news around the world. Hundreds of
national and international leaders wired congratulations. Only radio
Moscow was silent."' 9
In addition to the perceived foreign policy benefits that would accrue from
desegregation, the inconsistency and inequity of the willingness of the U.S. to go
to war to fight the racist regime of Nazi Germany while maintaining similar
policies at home was keenly perceived by the domestic black population, many
of whom had participated as soldiers in World War 11.20 As we discussed above,
the evident hypocrisy of this situation and the pressures it created both
internationally and domestically was not lost on the federal government. In
addition, Chief Justice Earl Warren's awareness of this tension at the time of
Brown is evident in remarks he made on the topic of civil rights to an academic
audience in April of 1972:
That change [the reversal of race relations policies in the U.S.],
however, was fostered primarily by the presence of [World War II] itself.
First, the primary enemy of the Allies, Nazi Germany, was perhaps the
most conspicuously and brutally racist nation in the history of the world.
... The segregation and extermination of non-Aryans in Hitler's
Germany were shocking for Americans, but they also served as a
18. Bell, supra note 3, at 12 n.30 (quoting ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN & CLARENCE C. FERGUSON,
DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW: THE MEANING OF SCHOOL SEGREGATION 11-12 (1962)).
19. BLAUSTEIN& FERGUSON, supra note 18, at 12-13 (quoted in Bell, supra note 3, at 12 n.31).
20. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 14, at 524-25 (stating that "Brown offered much needed reassurance to
American blacks that the precepts of equality and freedom so heralded during World War 1I might yet be given
meaning at home").
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troublesome analogy. While proclaiming themselves inexorably opposed
to Hitler's practices, many Americans were tolerating the segregation
and humiliation of nonwhites within their own borders. The contradiction
between the egalitarian rhetoric employed against the Nazis and the
presence of racial segregation in America was a painful one.'
The domestic civil rights movement recognized the opportunity that this
international political situation presented and attempted to take advantage of the
leverage created by the language of the new U.N. Charter to challenge domestic
racist policies. Initial attempts to invoke the Charter met with some success. Most
prominently, in 1948 in Oyama v. California," in a concurring opinion, Justice
Murphy invoked the Charter and its prohibition against race discrimination. The
case involved a challenge to a California state law which prohibited a resident
alien who was ineligible for U.S. citizenship from, among other things,
purchasing agricultural land, and also created a presumption of a violation where
such an alien paid consideration for any land purchased by another person. The
majority of the Court held that the law violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Murphy concurred with the majority's Equal
Protection analysis, adding a moving description of the history of discrimination
against the Japanese that gave rise to the legislation, and then discussed an
alternative reason for the statute's unconstitutionality based on the newly created
U.N. Charter:
Moreover, this nation has recently pledged itself, through the United
Nations Charter, to promote respect for, and observance of, human rights
and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language and religion. The Alien Law stands as a barrier to the
fulfillment of that national pledge. Its inconsistency with the Charter,
which has been duly ratified and adopted by the United States, is but one
more reason why the statute must be condemned. 3
The Charter was also specifically relied on by a California state appellate
court in litigation involving a direct challenge to the ban on land ownership by
aliens ineligible for citizenship in the same statute. After discussing the U.N.
Charter and the U.S. commitment to its "concept of respect for human rights and
for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion, '24 the court held that the Alien Land Law's land ownership ban was
"[c]learly such a discrimination against a people of one race [which] is contrary
21. Chief Justice Earl Warren, Notre Dame Law School Civil Rights Lectures, 48 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
14,41 (1972).
22. 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
23. Id. at 673 (Murphy, J., concurring).
24. Sei Fuji v. State, 217 P.2d 481, 485-86 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950).
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both to the letter and to the spirit of the Charter which, as a treaty, is paramount
to every law of every state in conflict with it.""
This victory for advocates of the direct enforceability of the Charter was
short-lived, however: the California Supreme Court upheld the result in Sei Fuji
but on different grounds and specifically rejected the lower court's reliance on
the Charter, finding that it was not self-executing.26
In addition to the formal leverage provided by the United Nations Charter,
civil rights groups also recognized and attempted to exploit the moral pressures
created by the inconsistency of the U.S. position abroad and its domestic policies.
W.E.B. Du Bois articulated the international connection to domestic U.S. racial
policies as early as 1923 stating that "the problem of the color line, is
international and no matter how desperately and firmly we may be interested in
the settlement of the race problem... it cannot ultimately be settled without
consulation and cooperation with the whole civilized world.
'' 27 In 1946, the
National Negro Congress submitted a petition to the U.N. on behalf of thirteen
million "oppressed Negro citizens" calling on the U.N. to study racial relations in
the U.S. and take any action necessary to ensure U.S. compliance with
international standards.zs The NAACP submitted a similar petition in 1947
seeking international intervention in U.S. race relations. And the American Civil
Rights Congress submitted a petition to the U.N. general assembly charging the
U.S. with violations of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide. 29 Although none of these petitions were ultimately
successful, they generated significant attention and support from both domestic
organizations and other-primarily developing--countries and thus succeeded in
increasing the pressure on the U.S. to take action concerning race
discrimination. 3°
25. Id. at 488.
26. Sei Fuji v. State, 242 P.2d 617, 619-22 (Cal. 1952). The Court did, however, express strong support
for the Charter and its objectives:
The humane and enlightened objectives of the United Nations Charter are, of course, entitled to
respectful consideration by the courts and Legislatures of every member nation, since that
document expresses the universal desire of thinking men for peace and for equality of rights
and opportunities. The charter represents a moral commitment of foremost importance, and we
must not permit the spirit of our pledge to be compromised or disparaged in either our
domestic or foreign affairs.
Id. at 622.
27. Gay J. McDougall, Toward a Meaningful International Regime: The Domestic Relevance of
International Efforts to Eliminate All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 40 HOW. L.J. 571, 572 (1997) (quoting
W.E.B. DUBOIS, PEACE AND FOREIGN RELATIONS, CRISIS, Nov. 9, 1923).
28. McDougall, supra note 27, at 573; see also Janken, From Colonial Liberation to Cold War
Liberalism: Walter White, the NAACP and Foreign Affairs, 1941-1955, in 21 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 1074,
1098 (1998).
29. McDougall, supra note 27, at 574.
30. McDougall provides a succinct account of the specific pressures faced and the, at times, conflicting
actions taken by the Truman Administration as a result of the inconsistencies between the international
commitments of the U.S. and its domestic policies. Id. at 575-76. For an extended discussion of the tremendous
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In reaction to this growing trend towards reliance on the Charter and other
international treaties to create domestic change, a campaign developed in
Congress to restrict the power of the President to commit the U.S. to international
agreements." This campaign culminated in 1951 with the introduction of a
constitutional amendment by Senator John Bricker, a Republican from Ohio,
which would have severely curtailed the ability of the President to enter treaties.32
In order to avoid the potential that this damaging amendment might succeed, the
Eisenhower Administration promised not to submit any international human
rights treaties to the Senate for confirmation.33
The intense pressure created by creative and persistent exploitation of the
development of human rights norms at the international level by domestic
interest groups and the reaction by conservatives in Congress thus set the stage
for the ultimate decision in Brown. That context placed the U.S. Supreme Court
in a delicate position. Racial segregation had become a scandal of international
proportions from the perspective of many Americans, 34 and the foreign policy
establishment keenly perceived the damage it created for the U.S. image abroad.35
At the same time, the Court recognized the tremendous resistance that an order to
desegregate schools would meet in many areas, in particular the South, and the
significant pressure that resistance would place on the power and credibility of
the courts.
international attention paid to U.S. race relations in the post-war period, see Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as
a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61, 84-92 (1988).
31. See Dorothy Q. Thomas, Advancing Rights Protection in the United States: An Internationalized
Advocacy Strategy, 9 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 15, 19-20 (1996).
32. Id.
33. McDougall, supra note 27, at 576.
34. In one example of the growing public concern over U.S. racial policies, in a July 1944 national
survey of college students, 68% approved of the statement that the postwar policy should be "to end
discrimination against the Negro in schools, colleges and universities." Dudziak, supra note 30, at 66 n.16
(quoting HADLEY CANTRIL, PUBLIC OPINION 1935-46, at 509 (1951)).
35. Dudziak describes in detail the great concern expressed by various foreign policy personnel
including the following description of exploitation of U.S. race relations by the Soviets:
By 1949, according to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, "the 'Negro question' [was] [o]ne of the
principal Soviet propaganda themes regarding the United States." "The Soviet press hammers
away unceasingly on such things as 'lynch law,' segregation, racial discrimination, deprivation
of political rights, etc., seeking to build up a picture of an America in which the Negroes are
brutally downtrodden with no hope of improving their status under the existing form of
government."
Dudziak, supra note 30, at 89-90 (footnote omitted).
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 35
This context may help to explain the ambivalent nature of the Brown
decision and, in particular, the lack of immediate relief in it. It was only in Brown
H, a year later, that the Supreme Court crafted an order giving effect to the
constitutional principles articulated in Brown at the local level, including the
famous retention of judicial power over implementation of the order:
[C]ourts will have to consider whether the action of school
authorities constitutes good faith implementation of the governing
constitutional principles.
... They will also consider the adequacy of any plans the defendants
may propose to meet these problems and to effectuate a transition to a
racially nondiscriminatory school system. During this period of
36
transition, the courts will retain jurisdiction of these cases.
III. INTERNATIONAL EFFECT
Understood in the foregoing context, Brown did not appear out of the blue as
a dramatic and unprecedented exercise of judicial power to force societal change.
Instead, Brown was in part a reaction to and in part a component of an emerging
understanding of the need for implementation of legally grounded human rights
norms and a growing belief in the power of courts to effectively enforce such
norms. Properly understood, then, Brown-while a significant milestone-was
hardly an anomalous development.
And, as predicted by the foreign policy establishment, Brown was heralded
by the international community and dramatically enhanced the standing of the
U.S. within the international community.37 Its ongoing legacy, however, has been
much more significant than simply providing a temporary boost to the U.S.
efforts to counter communist propaganda. Searches through the case law of
various constitutional democracies reveals a relatively small number of direct
citations to the Brown decision itself. Nevertheless, the wide-ranging and intense
coverage that Brown received internationally and the prominent image it enjoys
as a watermark in civil rights litigation demonstrate the tremendous influence
that Brown has exercised in direct and indirect ways.
There are three specific areas where the legacy of Brown can be explicitly
traced: First, the elimination of racial segregation on constitutional and legal
grounds; second, the importance of education in a democratic society; and third,
the development of innovative judicial enforcement powers. A close analysis of
36. Brown H, 349 U.S. 294, 299-301 (1955).
37. See Dudziak, supra note 30, at 114-15.
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selected cases from South Africa and Canada where Brown is cited reveal the
profound influence that Brown continues to exert in these areas.
Brown has played an especially important role in all three of these areas in
South Africa as the Constitutional Court has interpreted the post-apartheid
constitution. During the apartheid era, South Africa was moving in the precise
opposite direction as the rest of the world. Instead of beginning to participate in
and be influenced by the emerging international human rights movement, the
apartheid regime began to retrench and cut ties with the world community in
general and the United States in particular.38 The U.S. civil rights community
began to exert pressure both over U.S. administrations and directly against the
South African government beginning in the 1970s. During this period, Brown
was viewed by anti-apartheid activists as representing the possibility for change
through democratic processes and the rule of law.3 9
During the 1980s, leading United States civil rights protagonists played a
crucial role in helping South African lawyers, black and white, craft tactics to
fight apartheid through the courts. Two of those lawyers had appeared as counsel
with Thurgood Marshall in Brown. Constance Baker Motley, a judge in the
Federal District Court for the Southern District of Manhattan, New York, made a
number of visits and encouraged black lawyers to use the law in protecting the
rights of their oppressed people. And, Jack Greenberg, then the director of the
Legal Defense Fund, played a key role in 1979 in establishing the Legal
Resources Center, which had signal successes in the courts in establishing rights
for some millions of black South Africans. Their association with Brown was
perceived as a badge of honor and respectability.
Following the peaceful compromise that resulted in the end of apartheid and
transition to a constitutional democracy, the Constitutional Court in several
important cases has cited Brown as persuasive authority. In the first example, In
re The School Education Bill of 1995 (Gauteng),4° the Court was faced with the
politically sensitive question of whether section 32(c) of the constitution, which
gives the right for everyone to have educational institutions based on common
38. See, e.g., Allison Thompson & Elizabeth Omara-Otunnu, Lawyers Reflect on the 'Ties that Bind'
South Africa, U.S., Advance on the Web, May 6, 2002, available at http://www.advance.uconn.edu/02050
602.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2003) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review). The article describes a
conference organized by the University of Connecticut on the parallels between race and racism and the law
between South Africa and the United States. The article describes parallels drawn by prominent anti-apartheid
advocate George Bizos:
"While your lawyers were preparing Brown v. Topeka, we took the opposite direction," he
said. In 1953, the apartheid regime, which was in power from 1948 until 1994, implemented
the Bantu Education Act, legislation denying African people in South Africa an education that
would enable them to become more than "hewers of wood and drawers of water."
Id.
39. See id. (noting that George Bizos recalled that "the United States had a significant influence on the
struggle in his country: 'We as lawyers followed the example of many of your lawyers and what they were
doing, especially in the 1950s').
40. In re The Sch. Educ. Bill of 1995 (Gauteng), 1996 (4) BCLR (CC).
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culture and language, imposed an affirmative obligation on the government to
establish Afrikaans schools.4' The Court cited Brown's discussion of the
importance of education to democracy in framing the issue:
Afrikaans .... like all languages, is not simply a means of
communication and instruction, but a central element of community
cohesion and identification for a distinct community in South Africa. We
are accordingly dealing not merely with practical issues of pedagogy, but
with intangible factors, that as was said in Brown v. Board of Education
of Topeka, form an important part of the educational endeavor. In
addition, what goes on in schools can have direct implications for the
cultural personality and development of groups spreading far beyond the
42boundary fences of the schools themselves.
In this passage the Court used Brown not only for the specific discussion it
contains concerning the role of education in the development and maintenance of
a democratic society, but more broadly to establish its democratic credentials.
This is an important rhetorical gesture because the ultimate holding is that there
is no affirmative obligation to support Afrikaans schools-a conclusion which,
unlike Brown, can be viewed as supporting majority values and failing to protect
minority interests. Given this context, the reference to Brown and the
acknowledgement that education plays a critical role in maintaining a viable
minority culture serves to establish that the Court is not simply running
roughshod over the minority claims in the case. The peculiar prominence of
Brown as paradigmatic of countermajoritarian judicial decisionmaking lends
particular emphasis to this gesture that goes beyond the specific language for
which it is overtly cited.43
The next South African case where Brown appears is the highly politicized
and controversial Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign,44 popularly
referred to as the "TAC case" after the acronym used by the civil rights
organization that was the named plaintiff. In that case, the plaintiffs argued that
the government's failure to take greater steps to distribute nevirapine, an
antiretroviral drug used to treat HIV, to HIV-positive pregnant women violated
the right to health care in section 27 of the South African Constitution.4 The case
41. Section 32(c) specifically provides that everyone has the right "to establish, where practicable,
educational institutions based on a common culture, language or religion, provided that there shall be no
discrimination on the ground of race."
42. In re The Sch. Educ. Bill, 1996 (4) BCLR 537 (CC) at 147 (footnotes omitted).
43. Indeed, the lack of any actual quote in the main text from the section of Brown referred to highlights
that the Court is relying on Brown as much for the larger values that it represents as it is for the cited section.
44. 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC).
45. Section 27 provides: "Everyone has the right to access to (a) health care services, including
reproductive health care; .... The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available
resources, to achieve the progressive realization of each of these rights." S. AFR. CONST., ch. II, § 27. One of
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was controversial not only because of the sensitive subject matter but also
because it involved the interpretation of one of the several socioeconomic rights
in the South African Constitution. A critical question in the case was to what
extent the Court would be willing to put its institutional power to the test by
critically examining the government's programs in these areas and issuing orders
that would impact budget decisions.46
The Court held that the government's existing nevirapine-distribution
program was inadequate and violated the section 27 right to health care. The
Court thus ordered the government to take steps to expand the program.47 In
doing so, the Court rejected the argument that it lacked the power to provide
injunctive relief in the case and referred to Brown as the most famous example in
foreign jurisprudence of a court exercising such power:
Most famously, the structural injunction was used in the case of Brown v.
Board of Education where the U.S. Supreme Court held that lower courts
would need to retain jurisdiction of Brown and similar cases. Those
lower courts would have the power to determine how much time was
necessary for the school boards to achieve full compliance with the
Court's decision and would also be able to consider the adequacy of any
plan proposed by the school boards to "effectuate a transition to a
racially nondiscriminatory school system. '
'
4
Significantly, the trial court in this case had issued a similar order requiring
the government to revise its policy and resubmit it to that court for approval.49
While affirming the power to issue such orders, the Constitutional Court
cautioned that they should be used only where necessary and declined to issue an
injunction at that point in the case.50
Thus, as in the Education Bill case, Brown operates in TAC as a paradigmatic
example of the power of courts to make countermajoritarian decisions and to
force social change. In TAC, the Court was acting in a Brown model-although
declining to exercise the full panoply of powers established by Brown; by
contrast, in the Education Bill case the Court was using Brown as a kind of cover
to make plain that it recognized the cost of its decision to a minority group.
the central interpretive issues surrounding section 27, is to what extent the caveat "within its available
resources" limits the ability of courts to require specific action that would impact the state budget. Id.
46. TAC is analyzed in detail in Ivan Hare, Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign: The South
African AIDS Pendemic and the Constitutional Right to Healthcare, EUR. HUM RTS. L. REV. 624, 624-30
(2002).
47. TAC, 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC), at[ 135.
48. Id. at 107 (footnote omitted).
49. Id. at 129.
50. Id.
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The final South African example involved the compatibility of constitutional
standards with prevailing morality. In S v. Jordan,' the Court dealt with a
challenge to an apartheid-era statute criminalizing prostitution. Part of the
argument against the constitutionality of the statute involved the fact that it was
part of the larger discriminatory apartheid regime. In upholding the statute, the
Court stated that "[t]he mere fact that the original legislative purpose of a statute
might have been incompatible with current constitutional standards, does not
deprive it of the capacity to serve a legitimate legislative purpose today,'"- and in
a footnote quoted the following passage from Brown:
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868
when the [Fourteenth] Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when
Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public education in
the light of its full development and its present place in American life
throughout the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if
segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal
protection of the laws. 3
The Constitutional Court thus referenced Brown in support of its refusal to
rely on the historical context of the prostitution statute, a necessary predicate to
its holding that the statute was constitutional.
The use of Brown in this context is very unusual; unlike the Education Bill
case or TAC, which, while making some moves dissimilar from Brown,
nevertheless cited it for two of its most prominent features: the connection
between education and democracy on the one hand and the power to issue
continuing injunctive relief on the other, Jordan cited Brown for a particular
approach to constitutional interpretation that is only indirectly connected to the
core issues of the case. This unusual use demonstrates the peculiar influence and
stature of Brown not merely as a seminal civil rights precedent but also more
broadly as an example of a court acting to fulfill democratic values. Here, as was
the case in the Education Bill case, the court is setting up a decision that might be
perceived as following majority preferences rather than supporting minority
interests and a reference to Brown serves to reassert its countermajoritarian
credentials.
Although particularly rich in examples, South Africa is not alone in its use of
Brown in these ways. For example, a New Zealand court referenced Brown as the
paradigmatic example of a court imposing a flexible remedy in order to change




54. Te Runanga o Muriwhenua, Inc. v. Attorney-General, [1990] 2 N.Z.L.R. 641, 651-52 (C.A.
Wellington).
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a student's right to follow a religious dress code, the student invoked Brown's
discussion of the importance of education and equal access to it to argue that she
was being denied equal protection.55
Canada, like South Africa, provides examples in each of these three
categories. Two prominent examples deal with education issues. In the first,
Justice LaForest drew on Brown in a similar fashion as the South African
Constitutional Court did in the Education Bill case. In a case dealing with
56religious objections to provincial compulsory education legislation, LaForest
rejected the plaintiff's argument that the legislation's requirement that he seek
state approval of an alternative education arrangement unreasonably infringed his
right to freely exercise his religion. LaForest adopted Brown's emphasis on the
important role of education in a democratic society in support of that conclusion:
Much of what was said by the Supreme Court of the United States in the
following passage in Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 98
L. Ed. 873, 74 S. Ct. 686 (1954), at p. 493, has application here:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and
the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our
recognition of the importance of education to our democratic
society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public
responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very
foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument
in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for
later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally
to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child
may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education.57
Similar to the way in which the South African Constitutional Court used
Brown in support of its decision to permit majority values to overcome minority
rights, here the Canadian Supreme Court relied on the same passage to affirm the
constitutionality of a state infringement on individual liberty. Again, Brown's
power as an iconic civil rights decision permits a court to reaffirm its
commitment to countermajoritarian values in spite of a decision that favors the
majority.
55. Sumayyah Mohammed v. Moraine and Another, [1996] 3 L.R.C. 475, 493 (Trin. & Tobago).
56. The plaintiff specifically relied on sections 2(a), the freedom of religion provision, and 7, the right to
liberty and security provision, of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
57. R v. Jones, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284,1 60 (Can).
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Ten years later in a controversial case involving the removal of a teacher for
espousing anti-semitic views outside of the classroom, LaForest again relied on
Brown, this time to support the conclusion that removing a teacher from
classroom duties under these circumstances does not violate freedom of speech:
"As stated in Brown, . . . education awakens children to the values a society
hopes to foster and to nurture. Young children are especially vulnerable to the
messages conveyed by their teachers.""8 Here Justice LaForest used Brown both
as a classic articulation of the importance of education to democracy but at the
same time to reference the Court's commitment to the values represented by
Brown despite the infringement on individual liberty that the holding represents.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although Brown has been cited directly in only a few cases, as these
precedents reveal, it stands as an example in many countries of the tremendous
potential that the legal process has to promote human rights.59 In this way, Brown
really operates as a metaphor for both the promise and the difficulties that the
American version of the rule of law offers to the world. On the one hand, the
high organization and tremendous willingness of American civil rights
organizations to use litigation as a tool and courts as a venue to effect social
change gives practical content to the idea that the rule of law has value in itself.
Thus one 1999 article discussing human rights litigation in Europe cites "[t]he
much-heralded strategic litigation campaign to strike down legalized racial
segregation in American public schools," as paradigmatic of the kind of social-
change litigation it advocates.' ° The article goes on to contrast the well-developed
and innovative use of human-rights litigation in the U.S. with the existing state of
affairs in Europe, and further explains that
58. Attis v. New Brunswick Dist. No. 15 Bd. of Educ., [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825 IN 81-82.
59. The symbolic power and unique status of Brown is further illustrated by the fact that it is often cited
in ways that assume knowledge of its details. See, e.g., Egan v. Canada, [1995] S.C.R. 513, 594 (Canada) (Cory,
J., dissenting) (discussing the detrimental effect a statute's refusal to recognize a group's legitimacy can have on
the "sense of self-worth and dignity of [their] members" and citing Brown, noting that "[t]his principle has been
recognized in the cases of the U.S. Supreme Court dealing with the segregation of races"); Operation Dismantle
v. The Queen, [1985] S.C.R. 441,468-69 (discussing application of the political question doctrine as articulated
in U.S. cases to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and noting, without discussing the case, that
Brown is an example of a case the U.S. Supreme Court was willing to decide despite clear concerns of judicial
umanageability). Brown is similarly recognized as a "famous" example in secondary literature on civil rights.
See LITIGATING ECONOMIC SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: ACHIEVEMENTS CHALLENGES AND STRATEGIES
17 (Malcolm Langford, ed. 2004) ("The most famous case in the socio-economic arena is Brown v. Board of
Education, in which the segregation of black and white school children and university students was ruled a
contravention of the constitutional right to equal treatment before the law (Chapter 9)."). In that same book,
Croatian civil rights litigators note their use of Brown in cases seeking to enforce the education and equal
opportunity rights in the Croatian Constitution. Id. at 137, Box 3 Educational Segregation in Europe (noting
that litigators are "citing US case law on segregation like Brown v. Board of Education").
60. James A. Goldston, Race Discrimination Litigation in Europe: Problems and Prospects, 5 EUR.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 462,462 (1998).
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[t]hough the entire rights discourse has come under criticism in recent
years, particularly in the United States, there can be little doubt that, in
areas (such as much of Eastern Europe) where the rule of law rests on
fragile foundations, the framing of a social problem in terms of legal
61rights may itself be revolutionary.
This example demonstrates that Brown has come full circle: decided in an
international political context dominated by the end of World War II with its
promise of freedom and respect for human rights and the emergence of the Cold
War ideological battle between democracy and communism, Brown sent the
important political message that the United States would live up to the promises
it had made to the international community. Writing twenty years ago, on the
thirtieth anniversary of Brown, Thomas Sowell said: "May 17, 1954 was a
momentous day in the history of the United States, and perhaps the world.
Something happened that afternoon that was all too rare in human history. A
great nation voluntarily acknowledged and repudiated its own oppression of a
part of its own people."62
Now, Brown, and more broadly the reliance on human rights to effect
political change that it represents, stands as a model for the kind of progressive
social change that litigation can create and courts can protect.
If the international story of Brown demonstrates one thing it is this: What this
nation does for good or ill has international consequences. When the United
States ignores international obligations and leads through assertion of raw power
rather than through the force of its values, it undermines the international order
that examples like Brown have helped to establish. By contrast, when the United
States takes bold steps and makes moral decisions, as it did in Brown, it
contributes significantly to the development of humane and democratic societies
throughout the world. The far-reaching consequences of American action is
undoubtedly a burden because when taken seriously it requires careful
consideration of the views of the international community. It is, however, also an
exciting challenge for a country that has so often in the past taken the lead in
improving human rights throughout the world. Thus, as this country pauses to
contemplate the 50t anniversary of one of the most momentous decisions in not
only its history but also world history, it is our sincere hope that those reflections
include consideration of the important role that America plays in protecting
human rights and civil liberties throughout the world.
61. Id. at 464 (footnote omitted).
62. THOMAS SOWELL, CIVIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OF REALITY 13 (Quill 1984).
